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Abstract
The contribution of the left inferior prefrontal cortex in semantic processing has been
widely investigated in the last decade. Converging evidence from functional imaging
studies shows that this region is involved in the “executive” or “controlled” aspects of
semantic processing. In this study, we report a single case study of a patient, PW, with
damage to the right prefrontal and temporal cortices following stroke. PW showed a
problem in executive control of semantic processing, where he could not easily
override automatic but irrelevant semantic processing. This case thus shows the
necessary role of the right inferior prefrontal cortex in executive semantic processing.
Compared to tasks previously used in the literature, our tasks placed higher demands
on executive semantic processing. We suggest that the right inferior prefrontal cortex
is recruited when the demands on executive semantic processing are particularly high.
Keywords: prefrontal cortex; right hemisphere; semantic processing; executive
function; selection
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1. Introduction
There is now an accumulating body of evidence showing that semantic processing is
not only sustained by the temporal lobes, but also by prefrontal cortices, especially the
left inferior region (see Fletcher & Henson, 2001, for a review). More particularly, the
evidence suggests that the left inferior prefrontal cortex (LIPC) is involved in
“executive” or “controlled” semantic processing. Functional imaging studies have
shown, for example, that the activity in the LIPC decreases when a word is
semantically processed for the second time (repetition priming; Demb et al., 1995;
Wagner, Koutstaal, Maril, Schacter, & Buckner, 2000). On the other hand, activity in
the LIPC increases in different experimental conditions. For example, Wagner and
colleagues (Wagner, Pare-Blagoev, Clark, & Poldrack, 2001) asked their participants
to judge which word within a set of choice words (e.g. “flame” and “bald”) was
closest in meaning to a cue (e.g. “candle”). They found increased activity in the LIPC
as the number of words in the choice set increased (from 2 to 4) and as the strength of
association between the cue and the target decreased (a target weakly associated to the
cue requiring more semantic processing; for similar findings see Bunge, Wendelken,
Badre, & Wagner, 2005). Increased LIPC activity has also been found when hard
semantic judgements are required (category membership judgement for non-
prototypical exemplars, e.g. does “earl” belong to the “royalty” category?) compared
to easier semantic judgements (category membership for prototypical exemplars, e.g.
does “king” belong to the “royalty” category?; Roskies, Fiez, Balota, Raichle, &
Petersen, 2001). Thompson-Schill and colleagues also found increased LIPC activity
when the semantic task required selecting a task-relevant semantic dimension
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(Thompson-Schill, D'Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997; Thompson-Schill,
D'Esposito, & Kan, 1999). For example, they found greater LIPC activity when the
semantic judgement was based on a specific semantic feature (e.g. amongst “tongue”
and “bone” which has the same colour as “tooth”) than when it was based on global
semantic similarity (amongst “tick”, “well”, “shoe”, “school” which is most similar to
“flea”; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997). There was also increased LIPC activity when
an action had to be generated from an object that could be associated with many
different actions (e.g. “wheel”) compared to an object that was more uniquely
associated to a specific action (e.g. “scissors”; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997); LIPC
activity further increased when participants had to generate a word based one specific
feature related to the cue (e.g. an action related to “dollar”) and then later generate a
word based on a different feature related to the same cue (e.g. a colour related to
“dollar”; Thompson-Schill et al., 1999). More recently, increased LIPC activity has
also been found in a picture naming task, when the item (e.g. the picture of a shark)
was preceded by a highly associated distractor (e.g. participant had previously named
a “whale” from a verbal description; Moss et al., 2005) or in lexical decision, when
the target word was preceded by a semantically incongruent as compared to a
semantically congruent context (e.g. “head” preceded by “There was no hair on
his…”; Cardillo, Aydelott, Matthews, & Devlin, 2004).
This evidence for the LIPC involvement in executive semantic processing comes
mainly from functional imaging studies, though there is also converging evidence
indicating the necessary role of LIPC in executive semantic processing. For example,
semantic processing can be affected when transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)
interferes with LIPC activation or when LIPC is damaged following acquired brain
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lesions. TMS applied to the LIPC can reduce repetition priming in a semantic task
(Thiel et al., 2005) and accuracy in semantic categorisation (Devlin, Matthews, &
Rushworth, 2003). Moreover, patients with lesions to LIPC show greater difficulties
in selecting the context-appropriate meaning of ambiguous words (Metzler, 2001) or
the relevant action to an object, especially when several possible actions can be
associated with that object (Thompson-Schill et al., 1998).
Despite the general agreement on the executive or controlled nature of the semantic
processing associated with the LIPC, several issues remain hotly debated. For
example, it is controversial as to whether the executive role of the LIPC is more
linked to semantic retrieval or semantic selection (Badre, Poldrack, Pare-Blagoev,
Insler, & Wagner, 2005; Moss et al., 2005; Thompson-Schill et al., 1999; Wagner et
al., 2001). Other issues concern the functional specialisation within the LIPC (e.g.,
Badre et al., 2005; Bunge et al., 2005) and whether the executive role of the LIPC is
restricted to semantic processing (e.g., Gold, Balota, Kirchhoff, & Buckner, 2005;
Zhang, Feng, Fox, Gao, & Tan, 2004).
Studies investigating executive semantic processing have focused on the left side of
the inferior prefrontal cortex. In almost all cases, the right IPC side was either not part
of the region of interest, not discussed, or simply not observed. One exception is the
study by Wagner and colleagues (Wagner et al., 2001) who asked their participants to
judge which word among a set of choices was most related to a cue. The authors
found bilateral activation in the IPC; both hemispheres were sensitive to the strength
of association between the target and the cue (with increased activation when the
association was weak), but unlike the left side activation, the right side activation was
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not modulated by the number of choice words. The authors speculated that the right
inferior prefrontal cortex might be only recruited when demands on executive
semantic processing are particularly high. Consistent with this idea is the finding that
during an auditory semantic similarity judgment task, left prefrontal activation is
observed when the stimuli are presented in a clear speech condition but right
prefrontal activation is observed when the stimuli are presented in an acoustically
degraded form, presumably because the controlled processes increase in that latter
condition (Sharp, Scott, & Wise, 2004).
In this study we report the case of a patient who presented with a deficit in executive
semantic processing, but who, contrary to prior cases, suffered damage to the right
inferior frontal and superior temporal cortices. The deficit became apparent under
conditions where competition for selection between semantic representations was
maximised. The data suggest the necessary role of the right hemisphere in selecting
semantic representations under high levels of competition.
2. Case report
PW was a retired florist who was 72 years old at the time of testing. Four years prior
to the testing, he suffered a right hemisphere stroke which affected the right middle
and inferior frontal gyri as well as the right superior temporal gyrus (see Figure 1). As
a result of his stroke, PW showed a left upper limb hemiplegia and as most obvious
cognitive impairment, executive function deficits. PW was strongly right-handed and
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scored 10/10 for right hand responses on everyday tests, measured using the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory.
Insert Figure 1 about here
On formal testing, PW showed good orientation in time and space as well as relatively
spared verbal and visual long term memory. On the Elevator Counting test
(Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway, & Nimmo-Smith, 1994), PW scored 6/7 showing slight
difficulties in sustained attention. On part B of the Trail Making Test (Reitan, 1958),
PW’s performance was spared (between the percentile 50 and 75). Nevertheless, a
clear impairment in executive function was apparent in the Brixton Spatial
Anticipation test where PW made 35 errors (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) and the
Hayling Test (Burgess et al., 1997) where PW had an overall scaled score of 1, with
performance on both tasks being classified as “impaired”. In a task designed to test
response inhibition (i.e. when you see one finger raised say “two”; when you see two
fingers raised say “one”), PW’s score was significantly below the normal range (-6.72
SD).
PW’s language abilities were assessed on a range of formal tests. His score on the
Category-Specific Names Test (McKenna, 1997), a difficult picture naming test, was
spared: he named 17/30 correct for non-praxic objects (0.97 SD below the controls’
mean score), 18/30 for praxic objects (1.47 SD below the controls’ mean score), 20/30
for animals (0.55 SD below the controls’ mean score) and 19/30 for fruit and
vegetables (0.34 SD below the controls’ mean score). PW’s scores were slightly
impaired on an oral and written synonym judgment task for concrete and abstract
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words (scoring 76% and 75% correct respectively) as well as on an oral and written
sentence/picture matching task (PW scored 73% and 70% correct respectively,
PALPA tests 55-56, Kay, Lesser, & Coltheart, 1992). Quite strikingly, in these latter
tasks, most of PW’s errors consisted in choosing the opposite meaning of the target
(e.g. for the sentence “the girl’s selling the cat”, PW choose the picture of a girl
buying the cat; for the sentence “This girl’s got less dogs”, PW choose the picture of
the girl with most dogs). In an auditory comprehension of locative relations (PALPA
test 58, Kay et al., 1992), PW scored 54% overall correct and all but one error
consisted in selecting the opposite meaning of the target (e.g. “above” instead of
“below” or “in front” instead of “behind”).
Interestingly, “opposite meaning” errors were the only language problems apparent in
PW’s spontaneous speech production and comprehension. PW would complain, for
example, that he couldn’t play his favourite card game anymore, because he confused
the words “higher” and “lower”. In conversations with us, he would produce
sentences like “flu jabs have been recommended for people under the age of 65”.
When asked to resolve simple arithmetic, he would perform subtractions instead of
additions (e.g. 8 + 2 = 6) and, when asked what days comes after a certain target day
of the week (e.g. Wednesday), he would give the day that comes before (e.g.
Tuesday). Note that these errors were observed although PW was perfectly able to
recite the sequence of the days of the week in the correct order.
PW’s “opposite meaning” errors were the subject of this study, where we investigated
the extent to which the occurrence of these semantic errors depended on the executive
demands placed on semantic processing.
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3. Experiment 1: synonym/antonym distractors
The first experiment consisted of a semantic judgement task in which PW was asked
to choose from amongst three words the one which was related to the cue, according
to a pre-defined semantic dimension. For example, the participant would be asked to
choose the word that is closest in meaning to the cue “happy” from the alternatives
“cheerful”, “sad” and “conscious”. If we assume that processing the cue would
automatically activate words that are related in meaning in semantic memory, then the
executive demands of semantic processing can be varied by manipulating whether this
automatic semantic activation needed to be controlled/overruled to achieve the
correct, task-relevant matching. Accordingly, we varied the strength of association
between the cue and the distractor or target (this was measured through word
association norms and was taken as an indicator of the extent to which one word
automatically activates another word at a lexical/semantic processing level, e.g.
Wagner et al., 2001). In the “strongly associated distractor” condition, the distractor
was strongly associated to the cue whereas the target was weakly associated to the
cue. In our above example, the word “sad” is more strongly associated to “happy”
than the word “cheerful”. The cue (here “happy”) would thus automatically activate
the distractor (e.g. “sad”) more than (and/or prior to) the target (e.g. “cheerful”). It
follows that selecting the target over the distractor would require any competition
from the distractor to be resolved (e.g., to suppress the distractor). Thus, in this case,
the demands on executive processes should be high. In contrast, in the “weakly
associated distractor” condition, the distractor was weakly associated to the cue while
the target was strongly associated. For example, the cue word “neat” would be
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presented with the alternatives “tidy”, “messy” and “lucky”. In this example, “tidy” is
more strongly associated than “messy” to the cue “neat”. Here, the cue (e.g. “neat”)
would automatically activate the target (e.g. “tidy”) more than (and/or prior to) the
distractor (“messy”). In this circumstance, selecting the target over the distractor
should be less demanding in terms of executive control.
3.1. Method
PW was presented with a series of 144 trials. Each trial consisted of a cue word and 3
choice words. All the words were presented on A5 cards and were written in capital
letters using black ink for the cue on the top of the card and blue ink for the three
choice words presented in one row beneath the cue. The words were either nouns,
verbs, adjectives, adverbs or prepositions but, on a given trial, the cue and the three
choice words always shared the same grammatical class. Amongst the three choice
responses, one was a synonym of the cue, one was an antonym and one was an
unrelated word. The order of each type of choice word was balanced across trials.
Synonyms and antonyms were selected via the use of an on-line thesaurus
(http://thesaurus.reference.com). For half of the trials (n=72), the synonym was highly
associated to the cue whereas the antonym was weakly associated to the cue. So, for
example, the cue word “neat” would be presented with the following three choices:
“tidy” for the synonym, “messy” for the antonym and “lucky” for the unrelated word.
For the other half of the trials (n=72), the antonym was highly associated to the cue
but the synonym was weakly associated. For example, the cue would be “happy” and
the three choice words would be “cheerful” for the synonym, “sad” for the antonym
and “conscious” for the unrelated word. Associative strength norms were taken from
the Edinburgh Associative Thesaurus (Kiss, Armstrong, Milroy, & Piper, 1973;
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http://www.eat.rl.ac.uk). All sets of words were presented twice across two testing
sessions; in one condition, the participant was asked to choose the word closest in
meaning to the cue (synonym condition) and in another condition, the participant was
asked to choose the word that means the opposite to the cue (antonym condition). The
order of presentation of the conditions was counterbalanced, so that half of the trials
(set 1) were first presented in the synonym condition and the other half (set 2) in the
antonym condition. In the synonym condition, the executive demands are high when
the antonym is highly associated to the cue (the strongly associated distractor
condition) while the executive demands are low when the antonym is weakly
associated to the cue (the weakly associated distractor condition). Similarly, in the
antonym condition, the executive demands are high when the synonym is highly
associated to the cue (the strongly associated distractor condition), but executive
demands are low when the synonym is weakly associated to the cue (the weakly
associated distractor condition). Figure 2 summarises the design of Experiment 1 and
the materials are given in the Appendix.
The task was presented to PW as well as to two control participants (aged 56 and 57
at the time of testing) matched for educational background.
Insert Figure 2 about here
3.2. Results and Discussion
The controls performed the task easily and scored above 94% correct in all conditions.
PW’s performance is displayed in Figure 3. In the synonym condition, PW’s score
was significantly better in the weakly associated distractor condition (56/72, 78%
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correct) than in the strongly associated distractor condition (41/72, 57% correct;
Z=2.67, p<0.01). In the antonym condition, the same profile was observed (weakly
associated distractor: 39/72, 54% correct; strongly associated distractor: 18/72, 25%
correct; Z=3.58, p<0.001). Moreover, overall the score was better in the synonym
condition (97/144, 67% correct) than in the antonym condition (57/144, 40% correct;
Z=4.73, p<0.001). Note that PW’s errors never consisted in choosing the unrelated
word; instead he chose the antonym instead of the synonym and vice versa.
Given the norms available, it was impossible to perfectly control for word frequency
in creating the stimuli. Thus, in order to assess the contribution of word frequency to
PW’s score, we performed a logistic regression analysis with PW’s score as the
dependent variable and with the following predictor variables: cue frequency, target
frequency (synonym target in the analysis of the synonym condition, and antonym
target in the antonym condition), distractor frequency (antonym distractor in the
analysis of the synonym condition, and synonym distractor in the analysis of the
antonym distractor), task-relevant semantic dimension (synonym versus antonym) and
strength of association between the cue and distractor (strong versus weak). The full
model was reliable (χ 2 (5) = 47.39, p<0.001) and confirmed the significant effects of
the task-relevant semantic dimension (Wald (1) = 24.62, p<0.001) and the strength of
association between the cue and distractor (Wald (1) = 17.44, p<0.001) once the cue,
target and distractor frequency were partialled out (and these three frequency effects
were not significant, Wald < 1).
Overall, the results indicate that PW was more likely to choose the word most
strongly associated to the cue, irrespective of whether that word fitted the instruction
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to select the synonym or the antonym to the cue. Thus, PW’s could not easily override
automatic semantic activation (occurring through word association) when this was not
relevant to the task - a profile consistent with difficulties in executive semantic
processing. Over and above the effect of strength of association, PW was also more
inclined to select the synonym rather than the antonym to the cue, irrespective of
whether the instruction was to find the synonym or the antonym. One explanation for
this latter finding is that “matching” responses (same meaning) are more
automatic/less demanding than “mismatching” responses (opposite/not the same
meaning). Alternatively, it could be that a word activates more automatically its
synonym(s) than its antonym(s) (possibly because of greater semantic similarity
between synonyms than antonyms). Either way, PW could not focus on the task-
relevant semantic dimension if it was not the one activated automatically.
Insert Figure 3 about here
4. Experiment 2: semantic associate (non-antonymous) distractor
In the second experiment, the aim was to investigate if PW’s difficulty in resisting
interference from strongly associated distractors was confined to words that are
synonyms/antonyms or if it extended to words having other semantic relations. PW
was thus presented with a synonym judgement task, in which the distractor was a
semantically associated, but non-antonymous, word.
4.1. Method
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Eighty-four trials were created using the same criteria as in Experiment 1. The sole
difference was that the antonym distractor was replaced by a more distant semantic
associate (non-antonym and non-coordinate) word (e.g. for the cue “piece”, the choice
responses would be “slice” for the synonym, “cake” for the semantic associate and
“resident” for the unrelated word). On half of the trials (n=44), the synonym was
highly associated to the cue while the semantic associate was not (weakly associated
distractor condition). For the other half of the trials (n=44), the semantic associate was
highly associated to the cue while the synonym was not (strongly associated distractor
condition). For all trials, PW was asked to choose the word closest in meaning to the
cue (synonym condition only). The materials are given in the Appendix. Experiment 2
was also presented to the two control participants used in Experiment 1.
4.2. Results and Discussion
The controls again performed the task easily and scored above 93% correct in all
conditions. PW’s performance was better in the weakly associated distractor condition
(32/42, 76% correct) than the strongly associated distractor condition (23/42, 55%;
Z=2.07, p<0.05). The level of accuracy was strikingly similar to the level of accuracy
observed in the synonym condition of Experiment 1 (see Figure 3). All but two errors
consisted in choosing the semantic associate instead of the synonym.
In order to investigate the effect of word frequency, we conducted a logistic
regression analysis with PW’s score as the independent variable and with the
following predictor variables: cue frequency, target frequency, distractor frequency
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and strength of association between the cue and the distractor (strong versus weak)1 .
The full model was marginally significant (χ 2 (4) = 9.32, p=0.05) but showed a
significant effect of competition level (Wald (1)=5.81, p<0.05) once the cue, target
and distractor frequency were partialled out (these three factors were not significant;
cue frequency: Wald (1) = 2.58, p=0.11; target frequency: Wald (1) = 2.73, p=0.10;
distractor frequency: Wald (1) <1). We conducted an additional analysis, pooling
together the data of the synonym conditions in Experiments 1 and 2, adding the type
of distractor (antonym versus associate) as a predictive variable to the variables
entered in the previous analysis. The full model was significant (χ 2 (5) = 17.44,
p<0.01) and showed as sole significant effect the strength of association between the
cue and the distractor once all the other factors were partialled out (Wald (1) = 10.87,
p<0.01). So it was not the interference created by antonyms per se that affected PW’s
performance, rather, it was the interference created by strongly associated but
irrelevant words.
5. General Discussion
PW was presented with semantic judgement tasks in which he was asked to choose
among a set of words the one which was related to a cue according to a predefined
semantic dimension. PW’s performance was strongly influenced by the executive
semantic demands of the task. He made errors particularly when the distractor word
was more strongly associated to the cue than the target (e.g. choosing “sad” instead of
“cheerful” as synonym of “happy”) and he made more errors when the task demanded
1 For this analysis we excluded the two items for which PW’s errors consisted in choosing the unrelated
word.
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that he match words opposite in meaning (e.g. PW was able to decide that “offer” and
not “take” means the same as “give” but not that “take” and not “offer” means the
opposite to “give”). Such errors suggest that PW’s responses tended to be based on
semantic activation that arose automatically in word processing (through word
association and possibly semantic similarity) rather than executive semantic
processing, where automatic semantic processing may be over-ruled.
As noted in the Introduction, executive semantic processing has mainly been
associated with the left inferior prefrontal cortex (e.g., Badre et al., 2005; Cardillo et
al., 2004; Demb et al., 1995; Devlin et al., 2003; Metzler, 2001; Moss et al., 2005;
Thompson-Schill et al., 1997; Thompson-Schill et al., 1998; Thompson-Schill et al.,
1999; Wagner et al., 2000; Wagner et al., 2001; Zhang et al., 2004). Yet, in the case
of PW, impaired executive semantic processing was observed following a lesion
affecting the right inferior prefrontal and superior temporal cortices. At least four
explanations can be offered for this neuroanatomical discrepancy. One possibility is
that PW has unusual lateralisation of language functions, with some language
functions localised on the right side. However, this seems very unlikely. PW was
strongly right handed and he had no language deficits other than those noted here. A
second possibility is that PW’s pattern of impairment resulted from his right temporal
rather than right prefrontal lesion. The anterior part of the temporal lobes has been
mainly associated with a function of “semantic integration” when higher order
semantic relations need to be processed, such as in the case of comprehension of
discourse, metaphors or jokes. Semantic integration would be achieved by the
cooperation of both hemispheres but with the right anterior temporal lobe holding the
critical role of sustaining coarse semantic processing (e.g. the processing of weaker or
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more distant semantic relations allowing for the recognition of broader or novel
meaning) while the left anterior temporal lobe would sustain more refined semantic
processing (for a review, see Jung-Beeman, 2005). However, our semantic judgement
tasks were not very demanding in terms of semantic integration since our tasks
required processing the meaning of single words rather than sentences and included
words that were largely unambiguous in meaning. Moreover, even when PW had to
match weakly associated words (measured through word association norms), the
words were still synonyms or antonyms, and not semantically distant words. We do
not exclude the possibility that PW suffered difficulties in semantic integration or
coarse semantic processing in addition to the deficits highlighted in this paper.
However, we would like to argue that PW’s difficulties in our semantic judgement
tasks were more likely due to difficulties in semantic selection rather than semantic
integration. This still leaves the possibility open that the right anterior temporal lobe
is also involved in semantic selection. The third possibility is that lesions to the right
hemisphere (most likely the inferior prefrontal cortex) affect the functional integrity
of the LIPC. Such an explanation would be compatible with the functional imaging
findings and reinforce the hypothesis that executive semantic processing is actually
sustained by the LIPC. The fourth possibility is that the right inferior prefrontal cortex
might, by itself, play a crucial functional role in executive semantic processing. The
question is then, why is this role not more apparent in functional imaging studies?
One answer can be found when comparing the executive demands in our task with the
executive demands of tasks usually used in the literature.
In previous published work, the higher executive demands introduced in the studies
involved increasing the number of words being processed simultaneously (e.g.,
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Wagner et al., 2001), weakening the automatic semantic activation of the target (e.g.,
Bunge et al., 2005; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997; Thompson-Schill et al., 1998;
Thompson-Schill et al., 1999; Wagner et al., 2001), focusing on a semantic dimension
other than global semantic similarity (e.g., Thompson-Schill et al., 1997), and
enhancing activation of semantic competitors (e.g., Cardillo et al., 2004; Moss et al.,
2005). We propose that the executive demands on semantic processing in our tasks
were even higher than in the previous studies. The main executive demand that we
manipulated is the enhancement of activation from the competitors (through the use of
distractors that were more highly associated to the cue than the targets). In previous
studies, competitors were either not presented simultaneously with the target (they
were presented several trials earlier; Moss et al., 2005) or were not explicitly present
(the competitors were primed by an incomplete sentence; Cardillo et al., 2004). In our
tasks, the competitors were presented explicitly and, in addition, were highly related
to the cue through word association, arguably creating particularly strong competition.
Thus, our findings provide direct evidence that the right hemisphere (inferior
prefrontal and superior temporal cortices) is necessary for executive semantic
processing; however, which part of the right hemisphere and exactly which role will
need to be addressed by future studies. We hypothesise that the right inferior
prefrontal cortex is necessary when executive demands on language processing are
high, and that this region plays an important functional role by intervening when there
is high executive demand (as also suggested by Sharp et al., 2004; Wagner et al.,
2001). If this latter suggestion is correct, we would expect to find in healthy adult
participants increased right inferior prefrontal activation as the demands in executive
semantic processing increase in a task.
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Appendix
Test 1
Synonym highly associated to the cue (set 1)
CUE SYNONYM ANTONYM UNRELATED
abandon leave keep ask
absent away present great
achievement success failure condition
actual real imaginary fond
allow permit refuse spread
almost nearly exactly ahead
artificial false natural lean
clever intelligent stupid pure
clothe dress strip drift
complain moan praise leap
confess admit deny reach
connect join divide flush
construct build demolish throw
costly dear cheap silent
create make destroy scream
discover find miss work
enormous huge tiny bitter
exhausted tired refreshed funny
extremely very moderately already
fantasy dream reality ability
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fascinating interesting boring tribal
ferocious fierce gentle wooden
fluid liquid solid blond
frighten scare reassure choose
injure hurt aid repeat
joy happiness sorrow arrangement
loathe hate love notice
neat tidy messy lucky
occupied busy vacant general
prevent stop allow hear
release free hold act
retain keep lose play
reveal show conceal depend
sick ill healthy steady
simple easy complex rotten
unite join separate afford
Synonym highly associated to the cue (set 2)
CUE SYNONYM ANTONYM UNRELATED
bold brave timid spacious
curve bend straighten scrub
damage hurt repair hide
damp wet dry wild
debate argue agree obtain
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decay rot thrive pacify
decorate paint spoil combine
deficit loss excess frame
definite certain vague silent
degrade lower promote imagine
delay wait hurry aim
delicate fragile tough lucky
dense thick sparse valid
depart leave arrive reflect
destiny fate chance generation
detect find overlook understand
diminish lessen grow hire
disease illness health league
disgrace shame honour occasion
doubtful dubious certain violent
dread fear welcome address
dreary dull cheery thirsty
futile useless effective plain
gather collect scatter activate
generous kind stingy ready
genuine real counterfeit able
gradual slow abrupt bold
grief sorrow joy appetite
harm hurt benefit wonder
hasty quick deliberate flat
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pick choose reject boost
section part total type
soothe calm excite relate
strange odd familiar willing
victory win defeat page
wary careful foolhardy flexible
Antonym highly associated to the cue (set 1)
CUE SYNONYM ANTONYM UNRELATED
above over below until
add tally subtract surround
adult grown-up child door
after later before other
always invariably never along
ascend mount descend announce
asleep dormant awake poisonous
buy purchase sell remind
clean spotless dirty wiry
cold cool hot fair
come approach go stock
decrease reduce increase disturb
empty hollow full wild
enemy rival friend income
expansion enlargement contraction affinity
When “happy” means “sad”
25
fact truth fiction agony
fast quick slow pale
float sail sink convince
gain acquire lose roar
give offer take read
happy cheerful sad conscious
hate despise love absorb
include comprise exclude flick
inferior worse superior dramatic
live exist die pick
more extra less certain
near close far still
new modern old light
pull drag push burn
right correct wrong junior
rise climb fall stare
rough coarse smooth unique
soft fluffy hard alternate
strong powerful weak central
thick fat thin safe
under beneath over between
Antonym highly associated to the cue (set 2)
CUE SYNONYM ANTONYM UNRELATED
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active lively passive ripe
black murky white proud
blunt round sharp fair
dark gloomy light prompt
different diverse same rapid
divorce separation marriage fever
double dual single blonde
down under up still
dry arid wet active
dull dingy bright medium
early premature late absurd
first original last local
front beginning back ability
future tomorrow past wind
good pleasant bad late
go advance stop realize
happy cheerful sad organic
heaven utopia hell adjustment
heavy weighty light civil
long extended short dear
loose slack tight serene
loser failure winner accent
loud noisy soft intact
low deep high common
major important minor north
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majority mass minority advice
many abundant few cubic
masculine male feminine symbolic
minimum least maximum opinion
miss ignore hit jump
sober temperate drunk intricate
sour bitter sweet brief
stand rise sit send
start commence finish appeal
war battle peace season
wide expansive narrow legal
Test 2
Synonym highly associated to the cue
CUE SYNONYM ASSOCIATE UNRELATED
deity god heaven hotel
dirt filth hand guitar
disturbance noise police tissue
document paper solicitor crown
donkey ass hoof diagram
frock dress party pool
gale wind warning throat
gap space tooth cattle
garbage rubbish bin reunion
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gash cut knee sin
gasp breath surprise grass
gaze look star owner
gender sex female arm
gift present ribbon daylight
globe world geography access
grab snatch smash reconcile
grease oil hair basis
hazard danger light quality
jail prison bar relationship
lid top jar deputy
livery stable horse scheme
location place film stress
loft attic house ratio
lotion cream face rhythm
madness insanity asylum contour
malady illness doctor site
martyr saint faith theme
material cloth wealth ward
midst middle crowd relief
mob crowd rule task
pile heap money act
pistol gun bullet screen
price cost range century
reply answer letter effort
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saliva spit gland agony
tale story fairy source
textile cloth mill horn
toil work sweat walk
tomb grave stone wheel
topic subject conversation village
try attempt succeed translate
twist turn shout vary
Associate highly associated to the cue
CUE SYNONYM ASSOCIATE UNRELATED
crust edge bread nose
damsel girl distress academy
delinquent irresponsible juvenile ironic
den burrow lion recipe
department section store term
desert wilderness sand pip
desk table chair song
diet fast food stage
dive plunge swim forgive
dog hound cat magic
doll toy house grain
donor giver blood branch
dot point dash soul
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dragon monster fly melody
drug chemical addict fuse
dumb mute deaf weary
fur hair coat pattern
garage storage car air
generation era gap farmer
graft transplant skin factor
graph plot paper performance
guardian defender angel lung
handicap disability golf pearl
handle knob door planet
harbour dock boat nut
headmaster principal school meeting
link connection chain wine
log stick fire data
lump cluster sugar net
matter substance fact text
media publicity mass piano
medicine remedy doctor unit
member associate club concept
paint pigment brush jury
picture drawing frame tree
piece slice cake resident
plank board wood sky
population community explosion sport
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segment portion orange gallery
sentence punishment death nature
swoop descent bird plug
target objective arrow absence
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Figure 1. MRI scans (T1-weighted axial slices) showing PW’s right fronto-temporal
lesion.
Figure 2. Executive demands in Experiment 1 as a function of the strength of
association of the distractor. The ticks indicate the correct response in each
experimental condition.
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Figure 3. PW’s percentage correct responses in Experiments 1 and 2 according to the
strength of association between the cue and the distractor. The line at 93% shows the
lowest performance of the control participants.
